External finance is critical for less established entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection can hinder competition. We model how lobbying by incumbents may reduce access to finance in countries where politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) the number of producers and entry rates are positively correlated with investor protection in financially dependent sectors, and (ii) countries with more accountable political institutions have better investor protection.
Introduction
Limited access to finance is a serious barrier to entry and growth for less established, new or smaller firms. Adequate funding enables entrepreneurs to overcome generic barriers or constraints to expansions. A broad range of evidence has shown that financial underdevelopment and limited bank competition hinder new firm creation and economic growth (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Levine 1999;  Beck, Levine, and Loyaza 2000; Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta 2006) . As poor investor protection limits access to finance (La Porta et al, 1997 , 1998 , it also has the effect of reducing competition. Thus any factor which fosters financial development, such as common law (La Porta et al, 1997 , 1998 , or voters preferences (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006 ) may indirectly favor competition. Zingales (2003a, 2004) have extended Stigler's theory of regulatory capture to finance, and argued that limited financial development may be the result of political influence of established producers seeking to reduce competition. This paper shows how the ability of incumbents to affect investor protection and thus competition depends on the degree of political accountability. In our model, wealthier entrepreneurs need less external finance and thus lobby for weak investor protection, to limit access to funding to competitors.
1 Reduced competition lowers welfare and makes politicians less popular, so the lobby needs to offer compensating political contributions ("bribes").
The equilibrium level of investor protection (and competition) is the solution of the trade off between the bribes and the increase in market power. Our main predictions are positive relations between effective investor protection and competition, and between investor protection and political accountability.
Next, we provide supporting evidence from a broad cross-country sample of industries. First, better investor protection, and other measures of financial development and financial access, does indeed favor competition and entry in more financially dependent sectors. Interestingly, the financial channel appears dominant relative to generic measures of contestability, such as entry costs, openness and economic development.
2 Second, we show that -after controlling for legal origin -effective investor protection is better in more politically accountable countries. A distinct contribution here is that we identify a measure of political accountability which appears both exogenous and robust to the most challenging controls. In general, formal measures of democracy as well as indices of political accountability are positively correlated with investor protection even after controlling for legal origin. However, these proxies rely on subjective evaluations and are clearly endogenous to outcomes (Glaeser et al 2004) .
Once we pursue the strong test of controlling for GDP per capita as a general measure of institutional quality, we find that formal and subjective measures of democratic accountability are no longer statistically significant.
Hence, we look for an objective measure of accountability in the emerging literature on the role of the media (Stromberg 2004; Besley and Prat 2007) . Media diffusion appears important for dispersed agents to monitor the actions of incumbent politicians and induce policies responsive to citizens' preferences [for a review, see Besley, Burgess, and Prat (2002) ]. 3 Media diffusion is correlated with education and measures of democracy, and is significantly lower when the media is politically captured (Djankov et al 2003) . We show that measures of access to information, specifically the diffusion of newspaper readership, perform extraordinarily well in explaining investor protection, and its effect appears complementary to legal origin. Newspaper diffusion remains significant even when we control for per capita income. It is positively correlated with education and negatively with state ownership of the press, but its effect on investor protection is not due to these variables. Once instrumented, newspaper circulation appears to be a robust predictor of investor protection. This is consistent with the diffusion of information being a strong proxy for the degree of informed private scrutiny on political decisions, which increases the political cost of market power.
This notion of political accountability echoes results on corporate governance. Diffusion of information via disclosure appears more effective at constraining managerial abuse than regulation (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006).
Our model is consistent with the results in Benmelech and Moskowitz (2006) , who exploit variation in suffrage across U.S. states in the XIX century, and correlate them with bank entry restrictions, incorporation and usury laws. They find that less inclusive suffrage laws were associated both with tighter usury laws (which restricted the supply of credit to new and risky firms) and less generous incorporation laws. He, Morck, and Yeung (2003) show that countries where the same companies maintain a dominant position over time have lower economic growth, worse protection of investor rights, and less developed capital markets. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) show that financial liberalizations are most successful in countries with good political institutions.
In a related paper to ours, Bebchuk and Neeman (2006) argue that lobbying by insiders using corporate resources to protect their control benefits undermines good corporate governance. Fulghieri and Suominen (2005) examine the role that capital structure plays in the relation between corporate governance and industry concentration.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and find its political equilibrium. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 4 concludes.
The model
Consider an economy inhabited by a population whose size is normalized to 1. There are two types of There are two goods: apples (which are also the production input and the numeraire) and apple pies (produced by entrepreneurs using apples as input). Individuals receive utility from consumption at t = 3 (the last period in the model). The utility of a representative individual i is as follows:
where and i i k c are the number of apples and apple pies consumed, respectively, and a > 1 is a constant. The specific functional form used in equation (1) simplifies the analysis, but is not required:
the essence of the results would go through for any quasi-linear utility function.
A firm needs to invest I W ≥ apples to produce 1 apple pie. The capital needed to finance the project can be raised in two ways: entrepreneurs can invest their own wealth w in their own company;
and/or they can raise funds on the capital market as external equity. 4 We denote the stake held by agent i in firm k as ik α and the equity stake owned by the entrepreneur e in his own firm as ee α .
As an alternative investment opportunity, individuals can access a riskless investment technology that produces (1 + r) units of apples in t = 3 for each apple invested in t = 0. Competition in the capital market ensures that the required rate of return on equity financing is r, which we normalize to zero. The maximum number of firms in this economy-m-is such that the net present value of setting up a firm equals zero. Specifically, in our setting this is equivalent to assuming m a I = − . The economy as a whole is not financially constrained; that is, the aggregate demand of apples as production inputs is smaller than the aggregate supply of apples ( / 2 (1 ) mW m w mI + − > ).
Timeline
At t = 0, entrepreneurs form one pressure group to lobby politicians on the choice of the degree of investor protection δ . (In an earlier version we show that the results are identical in the case of a general lobbying model a la Grossman and Helpmann, 1994) . We assume that consumers are too dispersed to organize in pressure groups or are unable to borrow money to lobby politicians: for instance, because one can borrow money only against future profits. Let ( ) L δ be the schedule of political contributions as a function of the chosen level of investor protection.
The effect of investor protection in the model is as follows: an entrepreneur can raise on the market only a fraction δ of the needed capital. We refer for simplicity to δ as investor protection, although in principle the specification captures any type of competition barriers. For instance, if entrepreneurs need to pay an up-front entry cost equal to (1 )I δ − before they can raise funds, only those wealthier than the entry cost can set up their own firm. This assumption captures the main features of the theoretical models in Modigliani and Perotti (2000) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) , and the empirical evidence by La Porta et al (1997) . With better investor protection, entrepreneurs can raise more external capital and need less personal wealth to set up a firm.
As an alternative interpretation, investors may be willing to lend up to I δ , because only such fraction of the capital can be used as collateral and the firm's output is not verifiable. In this second interpretation, improvements in investor protection relax the financial constraint.
At t = 1, a policymaker chooses the level of investor protection to maximize the following objective function:
where
is a measure of the policymaker's benevolence (inclination toward the social surplus), and ( ) S δ is the social surplus associated with δ . We take β to be a measure of politicians' accountability. In an autocratic country, β will be small because politicians are not accountable to voters. In a democratic country, politicians wish to be reelected. Hence, β indicates to what extent their record over issues is important relative to their spending in political promotion. As accountability increases, politicians need to give more importance to the social surplus if they want to be reelected.
At t = 2, an individual entrepreneur can set up a firm by investing a fixed amount of apples equal to I. Each firm produces a fixed output of 1 apple pie.
At t = 3, the output of apple pies is produced and distributed as dividends. The market for apple pies opens, and the equilibrium price of apples pies p is determined. Individuals then choose their consumption bundle and consume. The budget constraint faced by a generic agent i is as follows:
where i y is the total income produced at t = 3. For the representative consumer c, 
which represents the capital raised on the market net of investment by that entrepreneur's own firm e.
Market equilibrium
At t = 3, each consumer i maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3). From the firstorder condition (which is necessary and sufficient), and using the no-entry condition (a = m + I), we (
Higher investor protection is also reflected in higher social surplus (since consumers prefer more competition). To see this, consider the indirect utility of representative consumer c. Since the capital market is competitive and there is no asymmetry of information, the value of a generic firm k must be such that the return from investing in the firm's equity, / k p P , equals the return from investing in the alternative investment, which was normalized to 1. Hence, the income of the representative consumer (4) simplifies to c c y w = , while that consumer's indirect utility becomes:
Since c V is increasing in n, and n is increasing in δ, then c V is increasing in δ.
The income of a representative (active) entrepreneur e given in (5) The social surplus can then be written as a function of the number of active firms
The derivative of S(.) with respect to n equals (m − n), which is positive because n is always smaller than m.
Since n is increasing in δ, we obtain the following:
Lemma 2 The social surplus is strictly increasing with investor protection. The socially optimal level of investor protection is δ = 1.
In conclusion, the economy as a whole benefits from high investor protection. However, while this is true for consumers and (to some extent) poor entrepreneurs, rich entrepreneurs prefer low investor protection.
Political equilibrium
As a benchmark, consider first the case in which individuals can directly vote on investor protection.
Since consumers are the majority of the population, the political choice will be maximum competition (n = m) and high investor protection (δ = 1). The reason is that the median voter theorem applies because preferences are single peaked in the number of entrants n and the median voter is a consumer who stand to lose from low competition.
In our setting, the political outcome differs from the median voter's choice, because politicians who choose the quality of investor protection law or their enforcement do not care only about social surplus but also about lobby contributions. Since there is a monotonic relationship between δ and the number of active firms n, it is easier to think in terms of lobbyists and politicians choosing n. Hence, politicians choose n so at to maximize their objective function:
where L(n) is the schedule of political contributions as a function of the chosen level of competition, S(n) is the social surplus associated with n given in (9), and β still measuring the politician's accountability.
Entrepreneurs must set up a coalition to lobby politicians, who otherwise choose the social optimum. The coalition is chosen to maximize the aggregate utility of all member entrepreneurs net of the political contributions. Since the reduction in social surplus from a choice of competition n < m is
, to win the lobby must pay a contribution
Politicians will thus choose n < m if they are compensated for the associated reduction in social surplus. The lobbyist can effectively choose the desired competition level n by paying a political
The lobbyist will choose n to maximize the utility of entrepreneurs net of the lobbying costs.
Since the utility function of a generic entrepreneur j with wealth j w is given in equation (8), the sum of entrepreneurs' utility function is:
The lobbyist solves the following optimization problem:
From the first order conditions of this problem, we obtain:
The number of firms in the economy is
This level of competition is achieved by paying a contribution schedule L(n) such that
It is interesting to notice that competition is at the socially optimal level m only if β = 1 (i.e., only if the policymaker cares only about the social surplus) or if m = 1 (i.e., there are no consumers in the economy). In all other cases, competition is at a suboptimal level. The intuition is that, as β increases, it becomes costlier for the lobby to choose a low level of investor protection, because the policymakers require a greater compensation for deviating from the median voter choice. Greater political accountability induces the lobby to allow more competition in order to reduce the contribution needed to gain legislative support. The result is higher output. In this sense, political competition drives economic competition.
Replacing expression (14) into (6), we can find the corresponding level of investor protection:
Result 2: Investor protection is strictly increasing in political accountability:
The intuition is that β increases competition, and more competition is only possible with better investor protection (if one keeps the wealth distribution constant). Investor protection is at the optimal level (δ = 1) only if the policymaker cares only about the social surplus (β = 1) or if there are no consumers in the economy (m = 1). In all other cases, investor protection is suboptimal.
Empirical predictions
In Section 3, first we will test Result 1, according to which competition should be positively correlated with investor protection. To test this prediction, we will follow the approach adopted by Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a related analysis of the effect of financial development on growth. Their approach to curb identification problems and the criticism of omitted variables is to include country-and industry-fixed effects in their regressions. Country-specific financial development is then interacted with industry-specific dependence on external finance to test whether growth is higher in industries that depend more on external capital in more financially developed countries. Our empirical strategy is to apply the same approach to data on the number of companies in a sector to test whether investor protection promotes competition, and whether investor protection is affected by political accountability.
Specifically, this empirical strategy requires testing for a positive correlation between competition and investor protection when external dependence is higher. It is easy to see that the model delivers this prediction by observing that the second cross derivative of n with respect to δ and I (see equation (6)), is positive: that is ∂²n/∂δ∂I = m/W > 0. Thus, Section 3 will use country-level data on entry costs, financial development, law enforcement, creditor, and shareholder rights to proxy for δ to test whether:
Prediction 1: There is more competition (more active firms and more entry) in sectors with greater dependence on external capital in countries with greater investor protection.
Fisman and Love (2003) propose an alternative way to classify sectors according to their growth opportunities, defined as the US growth rate of value added by industry. In the model, the parameter m represents growth opportunity because it is number of firms that would operate in the sector if there were no barriers to competition ( 1 δ = ). The model predicts a positive correlation between competition and investor protection when growth opportunity is greater: the second cross derivative of n with respect to δ and m (see equation (6)), is positive: that is ∂²n/∂δ∂I = I/W > 0. This prediction will also be tested in Section 3.
We will then test Result 2, which can be restated as follows:
Prediction 2: There is better investor protection in countries where politicians are more accountable to society.
To do so, we will develop proxies for investor protection and propose several measures of political accountability.
Empirical analysis
Here we test whether political accountability promotes competition via its impact on the quality of investor protection. First, we analyze the relation between competition and investor protection across sectors with different degree of financial dependence. Then, we consider several robustness checks.
Finally, we explore the relation between political accountability and investor protection, controlling for other institutional determinants, such as legal origin. Table 1 defines the variables used in the analysis. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 . We measure competition as the number of establishments in a sector as the percentage of the total number of establishments in the country, a measure of relative firm density across sectors. As an alternative measure, we consider entry, which is defined as the average annual percentage growth in the number of establishments during the 1982-1992 interval from UNIDO. 6 Our data covers a total of 1146 observations from 37 countries and 33 industries. 7 We classify industries using the external dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales (1998) . As a robustness check, we also classify sectors according to their growth opportunities, as done by Fisman and Love (2003) . In both cases, US data are used as a benchmark and thus are excluded from the analysis. 6 This can be roughly interpreted as the growth in the number of (independent) firms in the industry, as it is defined as a "unit which engages, under a single ownership or control, in one, or predominantly in one, kind of activity at a single location." 7 UNIDO data is available for a large set of countries only from 1982 and is interrupted in 1992 because of a major sector reclassification. The countries included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, UK, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
Data
use predetermined or contemporaneous proxies for all our variables. Hence, we are not using any recent measure of investor protection, such as anti-self-dealing (Djankov et al, 2007) .
To analyze the determinants of investor protection, we use several proxies for political accountability. A first proxy is democracy score, which measures the general openness of political institutions (from Polity IV). A second measure of political accountability is executive constraints, as
proposed by Henisz (2000) . This variable characterizes the competitiveness of the political system in 1980. Our third measure of democracy is a democracy dummy, which takes value 1 if the country was a democracy in 1980 (and 0 otherwise). One concern with all these variables is that political accountability is something different from democracy. Politicians are truly accountable to society when voters are informed enough to punish politicians who do not choose what is best for them. To capture this aspect of political accountability, we use newspaper circulation in 1980, as measured by the Economist.
As alternative determinants of investor protection, we control for legal origin and per capita income, both well-established determinants of investor protection in the literature (La Porta et al 1998).
We use as a control the Gini coefficient of income inequality (from Deininger and Squire 1996), although probably only a poor proxy for wealth inequality. We will also consider freedom of the press, which is a qualitative measure of the independence of the press produced by Freedom House; state ownership of the press, which is a more objective measure of press independence from Djankov et al. Table 3 examines the correlation between financial and economic barriers to competition and number of firms. The first three columns show that all three proxies for financial barriers (effective investor protection, financial development and accounting standards) are correlated with greater competition in more financially dependent sectors, as predicted by the model. Columns (4) to (6) report the correlation between competition and economic factors which are likely to have a direct impact competition, such as cost of entry and openness, as well as a broad control of economic development, per capita income. These correlations are statistically significant but weaker than those for financial variables. Table 4 investigates the relative importance of financial versus economic barriers to competition, by performing a horse race between these variables. It reports the surprising result that measures of financial barriers consistently dominate, even once we test them against the strongest generic measure of institutional quality, namely per capita income. These results are strongly consistent with our first prediction: there is more competition in sectors that are more dependent on external capital in countries that have better access to finance. Table 5 and 6 report two sets of robustness checks on this basic result. Table 5 classifies industries according to the alternative measure of growth opportunities (rather than external dependence), as developed in Fisman and Love (2003). The results confirm the strong role of financial access variables relative to other generic obstacles to competition. An additional result is that here effective investor protection is the key variable relative to measures of financial market size. Table 6 considers another important aspect of competition related to contestability, namely entry. In these regressions -not surprisingly -the cost of entry has a significant effect. However, entry rates are indeed correlated with our financial measures, in particular investor protection and accounting standards.
Poor access to finance as a barrier to competition
Even though the data set offers limited options, we have performed additional tests which we do not report here. A natural indicator of market power would be profit margins, which the UNIDO dataset does not report. Of course, reported profits are most likely to be both very noisy, as well as downward biased precisely in countries with weak political and thus managerial accountability. From the available data we could produce a rough index of profitability defined as the ratio of value added net of wages and output. A regression of this measure of profitability on investor protection (and other barriers to competition) produced no significant results. An alternative but less obvious measure of competition is average firm size. We found a positive correlation between investor protection measures and average producer size, which is consistent with a reasonable view that larger average size suggests more intense competition.
Determinants of investor protection
We now turn to the implications of the political economy model for access to finance. Table 7 tests the relation between effective investor protection and several proxies of political accountability. In all specification we control for legal origin (La Porta et al 1997), a well established determinant of investor protection.
The table first reports the effect of three natural measures of formal democratic rights. Column
(1) considers the correlation between effective investor protection and a general proxy of openness of political institution, called the democracy score. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on both variables, suggesting that investor protection is greater in countries with higher levels of democracy, as well as in common law countries. A difficulty with this measure is that it contains subjective evaluations and may be endogenous. Indeed, once we challenge in column (2) its significance by controlling for income inequality and GDP per capita, the coefficient on democracy score is not statistically significant. We find similar results in columns (3) to (6), where we consider democracy dummy and executive constraints as alternative measures of accountability. While these measures perform well in simple regressions, in all cases they are no longer correlated with investor protection when one controls for GDP per capita, as suggested in Glaeser et al (2004) . Although this may simply reflect their strong correlation with income, it does undermine an independent effect of formal or subjective proxies for democratic rights on investor protection.
The last two columns use therefore an objective measure of accountability -newspaper circulation. Our results indicate that newspaper circulation is a very strong determinant of investor protection, and remains significant even when we control for per capita GDP. Newspaper circulation and common law together explain 69% of the variability. In column (8), the coefficients on income inequality and per capita income are not statistically different from zero.
The results are also economically significant. Using the results in column (7), an increase in political accountability by one standard deviation (0.165 units) is associated with an increase by almost one standard deviation in effective investor protection (1.37 units). This is strong evidence in favor of Prediction 2. Table 8 evaluates the robustness of these finding by introducing two alternative objective proxies for the quality of information diffused by the press. The first one is the fraction of newspapers owned by the state from Djankov et al (2004) . The second is the average level of education, defined as the years of schooling in 1980 from Glaeser et al (2004) . The results clearly indicate that these variables are significantly correlated with effective investor protection, but they have no explanatory power when we control for newspaper circulation and common law dummy. Thus, newspaper circulation's effect on investor protection is not due to differences in education and state ownership of the press. However, they may be used as instruments for newspaper circulation, to control for its endogenous component (since there may be more newspaper readership when financial markets are more developed simply because of greater demand for financial information). Column 5 reports the second stage of an instrumental variable estimation which confirms the finding that newspaper circulation explains investor protection together with legal origin. Table 9 provides a final robustness check for our model by running the reduced form regression of competition and entry on newspaper circulation and common law interacted with financial dependence as done before. In column (1), the number of firms is higher in sectors with greater financial dependence in countries with more newspaper circulation. A similar result is obtained in column (5) for entry. Common law countries are associated with greater entry and more producers (although the latter coefficient is not statistically significant).
The remaining columns of Table 9 investigate the relative importance of newspaper circulation and common law versus economic barriers to competition (cost of entry, openness and the logarithm of per capita income). The coefficient on newspaper circulation remains statistical significant in all specifications with the exception of the cases where we control for per capita income.
Controlling for per capita income is the ultimate test of whether media diffusion proxies for overall institutional quality. In those regressions per capita income is not statistically significant. This suggests that newspaper circulation is correlated with per capita income but the latter does not obliterate the effect of the former on competition and entry.
These results on the role of the media supports the view that more informed private scrutiny increases political accountability, just as disclosure rules aimed at increasing corporate transparency increases managerial accountability (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006).
Conclusion
This paper makes two important contributions. First, it establishes the existence of finance barriers to competition, showing that entry rates and competition are affected by investor protection in sectors that depend more on external finance. The effect of investor protection on competition dominates the effect of financial development, and persists after controlling for explicit entry costs, openness and economic competition. Second, it provides evidence that investor protection is correlated with political accountability, defined as the ability of informed citizens to constrain politicians.
Our model shows that the number of producers may emerge as a trade-off between the rents from restricting competition and the political cost caused by lower welfare. Weakening access to finance is a natural channel for blocking competition, both because it is less explicit than formal barriers (Rajan and Zingales 2003a) and because abundant funding is fungible to overcome generic obstacles to expansion. As the political system becomes more accountable, lobbying to limit competition becomes expensive, so the lobby seeks less restrains on competition, admitting better enforcement of investor protection. Thus an important message is that broader access to finance may matter for growth as much as capital markets development, as it produces a more level playing field.
The paper suggests that improving formal investor protection laws while ignoring its enforcement may not improve access to finance, as reforms may be captured by the current economic Entrepreneurs with limited access to funding may still operate in the informal sector, or at a reduced scale. Yet the evidence is that smaller firms in developing countries produce at very suboptimal levels, even though they show very high productivity of capital investment (Banerjee and Duflo 2005). Such findings suggest that limited access to finance is endogenous to the distribution of influence. As suggested in De Soto (2000), poor legal enforcement and unclear property rights limit individuals' ability to commit contractually and thus to raise funds. This affects growth because it reduces access to economic initiative to the benefit of established interests. Yet legal and regulatory reforms will produce reliable access to finance only if political accountability provides the necessary enforcement guarantee on investor protection.
There are reasons why politicians prefer lower investor protection regardless of lobbying by incumbents. If intense competition by a broader class of entrepreneurs increases accountability, the rents enjoyed by politicians will decrease with greater entry. Moreover, in many countries politicians and incumbent firms' owners are the same, further increasing the likelihood that entry and competition is undermined (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) . The dependent variable is the median number of firms in a sector as a fraction of the total number of firms in a country. The independent variables are several interaction terms obtained by multiplying growth opportunities (which measure the growth rate of value added by industry in the USA) with country-level variables: effective investor protection, accounting standards, financial development, cost of entry, openness and per capita income. All regressions include fixed effects for countries and industries (not reported). *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. The standard errors shown in brackets are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White correction correction and clustering at the country level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth opportunity × Table 6 . Robustness: Entry.
The dependent variable is entry. The independent variables are several interaction terms obtained by multiplying external dependence (which measures the industry dependence on external capital) with country-level variables: effective investor protection, accounting standards, financial development, cost of entry, openness and per capita income. All regressions include the median number of firms (as a fraction of total number of firms in the country), fixed effects for countries and industries (not reported). *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. The standard errors shown in brackets are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White correction correction and clustering at the country level.
External dependence × Table 7 . Determinants of investor protection.
The dependent variable is effective investor protection. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. All regressions include a constant which is not reported. The standard errors shown in brackets are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White correction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Table 9 . Reduced form results.
The dependent variable is the median number of firms in a sector in columns (1) to (4) and entry in columns (5) to (8). The independent variables are several interaction terms obtained by multiplying external dependence (which measures the industry dependence on external capital) with country-level variables: newspaper circulation, common law dummies, cost of entry, openness and per capita income. All regressions include fixed effects for countries and industries (not reported). The regressions reported in columns (5) - (8) also include the median number of firms as control (not reported). *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. The standard errors shown in brackets are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White correction correction and clustering at the country level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
